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## The Somalia-Kenya Relationship, 1962-1968: A Study in African Nationalism

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THE SOMALIA-KENYA RELATIONSHIP 1962-1968:  
A STUDY IN AFRICAN NATIONALISM

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
the Faculty of the Department of Government  
The College of William and Mary

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In Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts

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by  
Murray Lee Carroll  
February 1969

## APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is presented in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts


  
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
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The study of the political phenomenon of nationalism has occupied the attention of a variety of social scientists for at least the past half-century. There have been innumerable attempts to analyze its causes and effects and to categorize its manifestations into systems of logical genera which would permit a discrete cataloging of cases for orderly study.

Prior to World War II, the bulk of these studies concerned themselves with the growth of nationalism in Europe, and more particularly with the post-French Revolution period. From this body of literature, a fairly clear pattern of the origin and development of European nationalism can be discerned.

During this period, most of the researchers in the field seemed to feel that nationalism was essentially a European phenomenon, European in the sense of including all areas whose dominant cultural patterns were European derived. Except for Japan and India, little attention was given to what is now recognized as having been a nescient element prevalent in much of the rest of the non-European world, an element which only needed the political environment of the post-World War II period in order to come to the



surface.

Lord Hailey, in his extensive study of African problems written in 1939, did not mention the indigenous nationalist movements already widespread in many areas.<sup>1</sup> The Royal Institute of International Affairs' study on nationalism written the same year did not mention any nationalist movements in Africa other than that of the Afrikaners in South Africa which of course was rooted in European nationalism.<sup>2</sup> In the immediate post-War period, the drive of the nationalist groups, particularly those of Tropical Africa, was at first only imperfectly recognized. Although Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations Charter set forth the principles of advancing the political, economic, social, and educational development of the non-self-governing peoples, and encouraged the development of self-government and free political institutions, the colonial powers looked upon these statements as very long-range goals.

The nationalism of the majority of Africans is essentially the desire to develop a viable state from a diverse body of ethnic and tribal units whose sole basis of common communality is membership in an arbitrary creation of the

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<sup>1</sup>Lord Hailey, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

<sup>2</sup>Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism (London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

imperial powers. In many cases, the arbitrary colonial boundaries divided a single tribe among two or more European nations as well as placing disparate, and often antagonistic, tribal elements within the same geographic boundaries. Despite these ethnic diversities within the states, and ethnic communalities outside of the states, there has been very little effort to reshape the states in order to achieve greater ethnic unity. One major exception is the case where an entire ethnic group has been incorporated into a state with other ethnic groups or fragments such as the Ibo in Nigeria, or the Buganda Kingdom in Uganda. In these cases, there have been movements of a separatist nature.

The Somali Republic is a unique variant to the African pattern. This state, created out of two former colonial holdings, is inhabited by a single ethnic group with a common language, a common culture, a shared belief in a common descent and united in religion and basic law by the Muslim faith. This ethnic group is not, however, limited to the geographic boundaries of the Somali Republic; it also extends into the territory of its immediate neighbors, Kenya, Ethiopia, and French Somaliland. This unique variant has, therefore, given rise to a form of nationalism equally unique to Africa--irredentism.

Irredentism is the form of nationalism which develops when the ethnic boundaries of a people extend beyond the political boundaries of a state inhabited by them. It is

based on the belief that the proper role of the state is to serve as the medium of political expression for the ethnic group. When the ethnic group boundaries and the state boundaries fail to coincide, those portions of the people who find themselves under the domination of another state and the territory which they occupy are termed irredenta, unredeemed, and irredentism is the nationalist sentiment which develops within the mother country for the return of the alienated portion or portions. These terms appear to have been used in this context first by Guglielmo Oberdan, the late nineteenth century propagandist for the unification of Trieste and Istria with Italy.<sup>3</sup> From the works of Oberdan, the terms gained wider application and general usage.

The effects of irredentism in European history have been profound, and are so self-evident that they need not be repeated here. This form of nationalism assumes the characteristics of a holy war. It is usually vociferous, and is a major theme of the communications media; it often becomes a primary concern of domestic politics and a major determining factor in foreign relations; it is highly emotional in its appeal, and often violent in its expression.

In the case of the Somali Republic, the irredenta problem has been the keystone to both internal politics and

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<sup>3</sup>Ginevra Capocelli, L'Italia nel Passato e Nel Presente (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1945), p. 218.

foreign relations from the inception of the Republic in 1960. The goal of redemption of all Somali occupied territory not now a part of the Republic and its incorporation into "Greater Somalia" is firmly enshrined in Article VI, Section 4 of the nation's constitution, "The Somali Republic shall promote by legal and peaceful means, the union of Somali territories and encourage solidarity among peoples of the World, and in particular among African and Islamic peoples."

Extensive Somali irredenta are found on all of the land sides of the Republic: to the west in Ethiopia, the Ogaden and Haud, with about 20 percent of Ethiopia's land area and approximately 6 percent of its total population; to the north, French Somaliland with its population of some 125,000 people, almost evenly divided between Somali and kindred Afar tribesmen; and to the south, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya (N.F.D.), containing approximately 40 percent of Kenya's land area, and about 5 percent of its total population.

These irredenta, as has been stated, are a legacy of the division of African territories during the nineteenth century, when the Somali people and their lands were indiscriminately parceled out to Italy, France, Great Britain, and Ethiopia. Because of the extraordinarily homogeneous nature of the Somali people and because their nomadic living patterns were relatively undisturbed by the period of foreign occupation, this legacy of division has assumed a role of

prime importance. This outside intrusion served as a solidifying factor in overcoming clan differences and intensified the idea of being "Somali."

The feeling was perhaps best expressed by Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke, the first Prime Minister and current President of the Republic, when he stated:

Our misfortune is that our neighbouring countries, with whom, like the rest of Africa, we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations, are not our neighbours. Our neighbours are our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary 'arrangements.' They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same creed, the same culture and the same traditions. How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?<sup>4</sup>

#### THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. It is the purpose of this study (1) to examine a case of irredentist African nationalism, i.e., the "Greater Somalia" concept as applied to the Northern Frontier District of Kenya; (2) to analyze the effect of the concept on the foreign policy of the Somali Republic, particularly in respect to its relations with Kenya and the United Kingdom, and secondarily, in respect to its relations with the other African states, the Organization for African Unity, and with the non-African states; and, (3) to present possible alternative solutions

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<sup>4</sup>Information Service of the Somali Republic, The Somali Peninsula (Mogadiscio: The Stationery Office, 1962), p. vi.

to the problem.

Importance of the study. African nationalism in all of its aspects and in its multiple forms of manifestation is a matter of both interest and importance in the field of international relations. It not only has the potential to disturb the peace and to be the focal point of agitation and continuing unrest within the continent of Africa itself, but it intrudes into the functions of the United Nations and into the relations between non-African states as well.

A broad understanding of the more general aspects of the problem of nationalism may possibly be achieved by detailed case studies of its more specific and particular occurrences. Explicit case studies will also provide suggestions for the solution of the specific problem discussed. As previously noted, the Somali irredenta problem is unique among the problems of African nationalism. This fact does not detract from the potential contribution a study on it might make in the general field of nationalism, but rather it provides a comparative aspect. It was in this light that this study was prepared, a detailed facet, so to speak, of a much larger and much more complicated problem.

Scope. The Somali irredenta problem does involve three distinct areas: French Somaliland, the Ogaden and Haud areas of Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District of Kenya. In many respects this is a single problem with its genesis in the nineteenth century struggle for colonial

acquisitions, and its potential solution in the immediate post-World War II period. In the period since the U.N. Trusteeship was established over former Italian Somaliland, all three of the irredenta have taken on certain characteristics so that they have essentially become three separate problems. To discuss all three as a single problem is to neglect the special aspects of each, and at the same time would result in a study of a size and complexity beyond that desirable for a paper of this nature. For these reasons, the scope of this paper is limited to the problem of the Somali irredenta in Kenya, i.e., the Northern Frontier Region and adjacent areas normally inhabited or controlled by people who are ethnically classified as Somali and certain cognate tribes.

In respect to the time scope, a brief history of the post-World War II development of the Somali Republic is provided for essential background purposes, however, the focal point of the study is from 1962 through 1968.

Methods of procedure and sources of data. This study is a narrative analysis of the problem, based on various documentary sources. These sources included treaty texts, maps, books, newspapers, journals, white papers and reports issued by the nations concerned, United Nations Documents, and unpublished theses.

Organization of the study. The study is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is the General Introduction,

covering the statement of the problem, importance, and scope of the study. Chapter II discusses the British military occupation from 1941 through 1949 and the United Nations Trust period from 1949 through 1960. Chapter III examines in detail the problem of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, the Kenya Constitutional Conference, and their effect on Anglo-Somali relations. Chapter III analyzes the effect of the Northern Frontier District problem on Somali-Kenya relations and on the relations of the Somali Republic with other nations. Chapters II, III, and IV form a continuous narrative with appropriate commentary. Chapter V is conjectural in nature, looking to the possible alternatives in terms of answers equitable and acceptable to the states and peoples concerned, and at the same time promising some degree of stability and permanence. Chapter VI summarizes the study and presents the conclusions.



## CHAPTER II

### THE BIRTH OF THE SOMALI REPUBLIC

#### BRITISH MILITARY GOVERNMENT

The period of unification of British and Italian Somalilands under British military government from 1941 until 1949 was perhaps one of the most vital in the history of the Somali people, and might truly be called the gestation period of Somali nationalism. By using the framework of traditional Muslim law and the Muslim court system, backed up by district commissioners and British-officered native troops, they firmly dealt with the problem of inter-tribal warfare, and although it still occasionally erupts, the period of British military government ended it as a way of life.<sup>1</sup>

Based on experience gained elsewhere in Africa and on an appreciation of the traditional Somali governmental system, the British civil affairs officers encouraged the tribal assemblies to provide local government and also to provide liaison with the administration.<sup>2</sup> In 1946, the District and Provincial Advisory Councils were created. The Advisory Councils were appointed by the British Commissioners, but

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<sup>1</sup>One of the best accounts of the detailed functioning of the British Military government is to be found in the semifictional book by Douglas Collins, A Tear for Somalia (London: Jarrolds Publishers, Ltd., 1960).

<sup>2</sup>Guy Hunter, The New Societies of Tropical Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 298-306.

they were made from nominees put forth by the tribes. The Councils were encouraged not only to concern themselves with the day-by-day problems of the areas they represented, but also with such long-range problems as development of water supplies, range management, health, etc.<sup>3</sup> The attitude of the British in this respect is summed up by a statement of John A. Hunt who was responsible for a resource survey conducted between 1944 and 1950:

It is the duty of the protecting power to safeguard the existing systems of tribal customary and religious law, and only to give leadership as regards improvements and development. It is of the utmost importance that this leadership should be given by an administration composed of officers who love the country and the Somali people. Wisdom and knowledge are necessary, but neither ambition nor new ideological variants can replace the confidence of the people, which can be gained only by love and security.<sup>4</sup>

#### FORMATION OF THE SOMALI YOUTH LEAGUE

Perhaps the most important contribution of the British was in the political realm. A group of young, educated Somali discussed with the British Political Officer their ambitions and hopes for the development of a Somali nation which would be above clan rivalries, modern in concept, and Islam in its belief and legal precepts.

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<sup>3</sup>I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 119.

<sup>4</sup>John A. Hunt, A General Survey of the Somaliland Protectorate (Hargeisa: Chief Secretary, Somaliland Protectorate, 1951), p. 179.

As a result of these discussions, the Somali Youth Club was opened in Mogadiscio on May 13, 1943. The thirteen founding members came from all of the major clan groups and constituted the first truly pan-Somali organization ever formed. The British encouraged the growth and development of the group, and branches soon sprang up in all Somali areas. It was particularly strong among the Somalia Gendarmerie and among the civil servants. These two groups were already pan-Somali in composition and included nearly all of the educated elite of the country and the goals of the Somali Youth Club coincided with, and gave overt expression to, their beliefs.

The British support of this activity was not completely altruistic. They had freed the Italian population from the Fascist restraints on political activity, and a variety of organizations had grown up, representing the total spectrum of political belief. From one extreme to the other, however, they had one common concern, the future of Italy in Somalia. The Somali Youth Club represented an anti-Italian indigenous movement, progressive in nature, and cooperative with the British Administration, an effective counterforce to the Italian political activity.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>I. M. Lewis, The Somali Lineage System and the Total Genealogy: A General Introduction to Basic Principles of Somali Political Institutions (Hargeisa: Colonial Research Council, 1957), p. 101.

## POST-WAR CLAIMS

With the end of the war, forces outside of Somalia were moving to shape the future of the Somali people. By the terms of accepted international agreements, the Ogaden and the Haud, the Somali populated areas of Ethiopia, belonged to Ethiopia though under British control. Italian Somaliland was a spoil of war. The idyllic period of the British Military Government could not prevent Somalia from becoming an arena of international political rivalry, nor from again being divided by forces outside of the Somali people.

The first of these claims was exerted by Ethiopia. The Agreement of January 31, 1942 between Britain and Ethiopia which provided for the military occupation of Ethiopia had been forced on Haile Selassie. On May 25, 1943, he gave the British three months' notice of termination. A new agreement was signed on December 19, 1943 giving the British continued control of the Haud and the Ogaden without prejudice to Haile Selassie's sovereignty.<sup>6</sup> When the Council of Foreign Ministers convened in London on September 10, 1945, Ethiopia submitted a claim to Eritrea and ex-Italian Somaliland both. These claims were based on, "Her historical and legitimate claim to the reintegration of those territories which, for thousands of years, incontestably formed a part of

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<sup>6</sup>M. Perham, The Government of Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 439.

the Ethiopian States, stretching at its zenith, from the Red Sea in the North to the Indian Ocean in the South."<sup>7</sup>

When the delegates of the Big Four (Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the United States) and the "Little Seventeen" met in Paris on July 29, 1946 to discuss the terms of the peace treaties, Ethiopia again advanced her claims. British Foreign Secretary Bevin put forth a plan for a unified Somalia of which Great Britain would have been the administering authority. He said, in the House of Commons:

In the latter part of the last century the Horn of Africa was divided between Great Britain, France and Italy. At about the time we occupied our part, the Ethiopians occupied an inland area which is the grazing ground for nearly half the nomads of British Somaliland for six months of the year. Similarly, the nomads of Italian Somaliland must cross the frontiers in search of grass. In all innocence, therefore, we proposed that British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, and the adjacent part of Ethiopia, if Ethiopia agreed, should be lumped together as a trust territory, so that the nomads should lead their frugal existence with the least possible hindrance and there might be a real chance of a decent economic life, as understood in that territory.<sup>8</sup>

For various reasons the other members of the Big Four opposed the Bevin plan. France feared that she would lose her hold on French Somaliland if the balance of the Somali people were united; Russia accused the British of

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<sup>7</sup>Ministry of Information of the Imperial Ethiopian Government, Ethio-Somali Relations (Addis Ababa, 1962), p. 5.

<sup>8</sup>House of Commons debates, reported in the London Times, June 5, 1946.

trying to enlarge the Empire at the expense of Ethiopia and Italy; and the United States favored a TRUST status under Italy.

The final statement of the Paris Conference to the Foreign Ministers did not contain a specific recommendation in respect to the Italian Colonies. Article 23 of the final peace treaty with Italy agreed upon by the Foreign Ministers in New York in November 1946 and signed in Paris on February 10, 1947 called for Italy to renounce all right and title to territorial possessions in Africa, with actual disposition to be decided by the Four Powers at a later date based on the findings of a Four Power Commission established for this purpose by Annex XI to the treaty.<sup>9</sup>

The delay in the disposition of the Italian Colonies had resulted in a flurry of political activity in Somalia. The Somali Youth Club, now the Somali Youth League (SYL), strongly supported the Bevin plan and bitterly opposed the establishment of an Italian Trust; the Italians, recognizing their weakness, had been playing on tribal differences, engaging in a propaganda campaign, and freely spending money to gain support. When the Four Power Commission arrived in Mogadiscio on January 6, 1948 to conduct hearings, political activity was at a fever pitch. On January 11, 1948 violence erupted when the Italians and their supporters tried to break

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<sup>9</sup>United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 19, No. I-747 (New York: United Nations, 1951), p. 139.

up a SYL rally. Fifty-one Italians were killed and several were wounded. Order was restored by the Gendarmerie and the King's African Rifles, while the hearings continued in a state of tension.<sup>10</sup> The majority of the Somali witnesses before the Commission asked for a Four Power Trust for ten years, with the unification of territory recommended in the Bevin plan.

When the Commission reported back to the Foreign Ministers they stated the Somali opposition to Italian trusteeship and the desire for a united Somalia under joint Big Four trusteeship. Britain, France, and the United States now supported Italian trusteeship. The Soviet Union, previously a supporter of Italian trusteeship, now supported Four Power trusteeship.<sup>11</sup> No agreement could be reached and the impasse was finally resolved in September 1948 by resorting to paragraph 3 of Annex XI to the Italian Peace Treaty whereby, the Four Powers agreed to refer the question to the United Nations General Assembly for recommendations and further agreed to abide by the recommendations in the event no other solution could be reached.<sup>12</sup>

Ethiopian intransigence in respect to not only the

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<sup>10</sup>I. M. Lewis, The Modern History of Somaliland, pp. 125-26.

<sup>11</sup>Lewis, op. cit., p. 128.

<sup>12</sup>United Nations Treaty Series, op. cit., p. 214.

Haud and the Ogaden, but to the balance of Somalia as well, made it quite evident that the only possibility for a united Somalia would be within the context of the Ethiopian Empire; a solution equally unsatisfactory to the Somali and to the Four Powers.

Britain made one more approach to the problem by proposing to cede to Ethiopia a strip of British Somali-land including the port of Zeila in return for at least the Haud. Under the terms of the 1906 Treaty on the Maintenance of Status Quo in Ethiopia,<sup>13</sup> Britain consulted France on this alternative. France objected on the grounds that development of Zeila and its connection to the interior of Ethiopia by either rail or highway would interfere with the trade of Djibuti. It also appeared likely that the United Nations' solution for Eritrea would involve some direct relationship with Ethiopia giving her the Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab, thereby, making Zeila of little value.

British and Ethiopian officials started discussions on British withdrawal from the Ogaden in mid-1948. A Protocol was signed on July 24, 1948 and Ethiopian officials assumed responsibility on September 23, 1948. Britain did retain control of the Haud and continued its military government in former Italian Somaliland.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Sir Edward Hertslet, Map of Africa by Treaty, Vol. II (London: HMSO, 1909), p. 440.

<sup>14</sup>John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), p. 70.



## TRUSTEESHIP

The United Nations General Assembly discussed the Somali question during its third and fourth sessions as part of the overall question of the disposal of the former Italian Colonies. The question was first placed on the agenda on September 24, 1948 and referred to the First Committee which took evidence from the Somali Youth League, The Somalia Conference (a coalition of pro-Italian parties), and the Progressive League of Mijertein (a splinter party from the SYL). The Committee was badly divided in its general discussion: the Soviet Union suggested a direct United Nations trusteeship with an executive administrator and a nine-member advisory committee; the United Kingdom, supported by the United States, advocated Italian trusteeship; India recommended direct United Nations trusteeship for not less than ten nor more than twenty years with a plebiscite at the end of the trusteeship period; eighteen Latin-American States in a joint resolution recommended International trusteeship for an undetermined period; and Iraq recommended a collective trusteeship of five states. Italian trusteeship was finally adopted and the General Assembly undertook discussion on the First Committee's recommendations on May 17, 1949. It rejected the recommendation by 37 votes to 14 with 7 abstentions and on May 17 the problem was postponed for further consideration

until the fourth regular session (resolution 287 (III)).<sup>15</sup>

On September 30, 1949, the First Committee again took up the Italian Colony question. Discussions continued until October 11, 1949 when a subcommittee was formed to resolve the differences between proposals. The full First Committee resumed deliberation on November 1, 1949 and submitted its draft resolutions to the General Assembly on November 19. On November 21, the General Assembly adopted resolution 289 (IV) containing the following provision for Somalia:

Italian Somaliland should become an independent, sovereign State at the end of ten years from the date of the approval by the General Assembly of a Trusteeship Agreement. During this period, it should be placed under the International Trusteeship System, with Italy as the Administering Authority, aided and advised by an Advisory Council composed of representatives of Colombia, Egypt and the Philippines. The Trusteeship Council should negotiate with the Administering Authority the draft of a Trusteeship Agreement which should include a declaration of constitutional principles based on a text proposed by the Indian delegation. Pending the approval of the Trusteeship Agreement by the General Assembly, Italy should be invited to undertake provisional administration of the territory, pursuant to an arrangement for the orderly transfer of administration agreed upon with the United Kingdom and on condition that Italy should give an undertaking to administer the territory in accordance with the provisions of the Charter and of the draft Trusteeship Agreement.<sup>16</sup>

The Trusteeship Council approved the draft Trusteeship Agreement on January 27, 1950. The Italian Minister for

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<sup>15</sup>United Nations, General Assembly Official Records: Fourth Session. Supplement No. 1 (A/950), 1949, pp. 34-36.

<sup>16</sup>United Nations, General Assembly Official Records: Fifth Session. Supplement No. 1 (A/1287), pp. 11-13.

Foreign Affairs informed the Secretary-General on February 22, 1950 that Italy, subject to the ratification of the Trusteeship Agreement, had undertaken the administration of Somalia. The formal transfer of administration took place on April 1, 1950 and with it came the end of any attempt at reunification.

The problem of the border between the Trust Territory of Somaliland and Ethiopia remained unresolved. The British unilaterally established a "Provisional Administrative Line" approximately half-way between the Ethiopian and Italian versions of the Convention of 1908. United Nations Resolution 392 (V) recommended Italo-Ethiopian delimitation on the ground. Negotiations were not opened until March 6, 1956 when Italy and Ethiopia resumed diplomatic relations. After three years of fruitless negotiations, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for Norway to appoint a conciliator (UN Resolution 1345 (VIII)). Trygve Lie was appointed and for four months (August-November 1959) he tried in vain to find a solution.<sup>17</sup>

#### BRITISH SOMALILAND

Meanwhile, on November 29, 1954, the British had reached an agreement with Ethiopia terminating the occupation of the Haud. Ethiopian pressures had been steadily

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<sup>17</sup>Drysdale, op. cit., pp. 88-99.

increasing and British efforts to either purchase the Haud outright or to give Ethiopia direct access to the sea at Zeila in exchange for it had been rebuffed. The formal announcement of the agreement was made in Hargeisa, British Somaliland, on January 5, 1955 with an effective date of February 28, 1955. The terms of the agreement permitted the tribes from British Somaliland to continue to migrate into the Haud on a seasonal basis, accompanied by their own tribal police, and provided them extra-territoriality while in the Haud. A permanent British Resident with medical, veterinary, and educational staff members was to be based in Jigjiga to provide for the needs of the tribes.

The wording of the announcement as it was published in Hargeisa played up the advantages to the Somalis over the conditions existing prior to World War II. This did not change the opinion of the affected tribes that they had been betrayed by the British. Demonstrations were held throughout the Protectorate and delegations were dispatched to both London and the United Nations. The delegations were sympathetically received and politely listened to but they had, in effect, been presented with a fait accompli in which the interests of the Somali were distinctly subordinate to events of a broader international scope.

#### INDEPENDENCE

July 1, 1960 was the date set for the independence of the Trust Territory by a resolution adopted in the United

Nations General Assembly in December 1959. On April 6, 1960, the Legislative Council of British Somaliland passed a resolution calling for immediate independence and union with Somalia. The British Prime Minister on April 11 announced in the House of Commons that his government agreed, and a conference was held in London on May 2 to work out details.

On June 26, 1960, the Protectorate received full independence and severed its connection with the Commonwealth. On July 1, the Trust Territory received its independence and simultaneously, the Somali Republic was proclaimed.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>Sir Douglas Hall, "Somaliland's Last Year as a Protectorate," African Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 3, 1961, pp. 26-37.

CHAPTER III

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT  
AND  
ANGLO-SOMALI RELATIONS

GENERAL

Pressure for the full translation of Somali ethnic nationalism into statehood was further intensified by the formation of the Republic, not only within the new nation itself but also in those portions of the Somali people left outside as well. The intransigent attitude of both France and Ethiopia in respect to a pan-Somalia including the Somali under their suzerainty created an atmosphere of frustration and unrest on both sides of the borders. The more intense nationalists, encouraged and abetted by Egypt, pressed for the abandonment of that portion of the Constitution calling for union by legal and peaceful means and demanded the use of force.

For the new Republic, still financially dependent on Britain and Italy and with a small, ill-equipped and ill-trained armed force, to challenge either France or Ethiopia was beyond reason. The incipient independence of Kenya appeared to provide an alternative that would not involve force; the addition of the Northern Frontier District to the Republic.

The memory of the Bevin plan was resurrected and

British acquiescence was almost taken for granted. Forgotten was Mr. Macmillan's statement to the House of Commons at the time Somaliland's independence was granted that "Her Majesty's Government did not and will not encourage or support any claim affecting the territorial integrity of French Somaliland, Kenya, or Ethiopia. This is a matter which could only be considered if that were the wish of the governments and peoples concerned."

This statement remained the basic premise of British policy and was to become the major bone of contention. This position was taken by Great Britain in response to the deterioration in Anglo-Ethiopian relations resulting from the decision to grant British Somaliland its independence. Ethiopia leveled accusations at Britain that she was returning to the Bevin plan and covertly backing the "Greater Somalia" concept for her own benefit. To emphasize his pique, Haile Selassie went to Moscow and signed an aid treaty with the Soviet Union.

#### POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT OF KENYA DURING THE 1950's

While the political aspirations of the Kikuyu were being expressed in the Mau Mau movement, and the Somali elsewhere were developing a sense of political nationalism and unity, the Northern Frontier District Somali were almost unaffected. The Somali Youth League had been encouraged and nourished by the British Military Government in Somalia;

but in 1948 the League and all other political parties in the Northern Frontier District were proscribed by the government of Kenya and their leaders exiled. Because of its extraprovincial status, the Northern Frontier District was not represented in the Kenya legislature until 1956 when it was lumped with the Turkana extraprovincial district as the Northern Province Constituency. Neither of the major parties in Kenya, the Kenya National Union (KANU) nor the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), made any appreciable effort to get the Northern Frontier District Somali to identify themselves with a national party or with the Kenyan nationalist movement. Both parties are pan-tribal, but largely Kikuyu dominated and they considered the Somali as interlopers and troublemakers. The years of isolation imposed by the British had been successful in creating a barrier between the Northern Frontier District and the rest of Kenya.

With the independence of the Somali Republic, political interest in the Northern Frontier District quickened but its inspiration was Somali, not Kenyan, nationalism. Shortly after the formation of the new Republic, in an effort to bring the Northern Frontier District into a more active role in Kenya politics and to try and forestall the tide of Somali nationalism, the British proscription on political activity in the Northern Frontier District was lifted. Several political parties were formed both pro- and anti-



secessionist. The two pro-Somali parties, the Northern Province People's Progressive Party (N.P.P.P.P.) and the Northern Province Democratic Party (N.P.D.P.), were the best organized, particularly the N.P.P.P.P. Their basic platform was the demand that the Northern Frontier District should secede from Kenya and join the Somali Republic. The anti-secessionist parties largely represented the non-Somali minorities. They were badly fragmented, poorly organized, and lacked the Somali political astuteness developed through years of highly democratic tribal organization. Ali Adan Lord, President of the N.P.P.P.P. ran unopposed for the Northern Province Constituency seat. The Somali generally decided to boycott the elections on the basis that by registering and voting they were accepting Kenya citizenship and the anti-Somali parties could not agree on candidates. Literally by default, Mr. Lord became the first Somali to be seated in the legislative body.

When Mr. Reginald Maudling, the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, visited Kenya in 1961, Mr. Lord obtained his consent for Northern Frontier District representation at the forthcoming Kenya Constitutional Conference. Arrangements had already been made for KANU and KADU representation, but Mr. Lord convinced Mr. Maudling that they did not represent the majority of the people in the Northern Frontier District. Mr. Lord was killed shortly thereafter in an automobile accident and Mr. Abdirashid Khalif

was elected in a by-election and led the Northern Frontier District delegation to London.

#### KENYA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The Kenya Constitutional Conference convened at Lancaster House in London in February 1962. The Northern Frontier District delegation, headed by Abdirashid Khalif and containing representatives of all of the pro-secessionist parties, made it quite clear that they were not interested in any possible arrangements for the Northern Frontier District within the Kenyan context. In his first address to the Conference, Abdirashid Khalif stated,

Before any further constitutional changes affecting Kenya are made, autonomy should be granted to the area which we represent as a territory wholly independent of Kenya, in order that it might join in an Act of Union with the Somali Republic when Kenya becomes fully independent.<sup>1</sup>

The Northern Frontier District delegates irritated both the KANU and KADU delegates by stating that their requests were addressed solely to the British Government because the British Government had initially established the Protectorate and later incorporated it into Kenya; the British Government had further separated the Somali people by the cession of Jubaland to Italy in 1925; the British Government by its administration of the Northern Frontier District had

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<sup>1</sup>Kenya Constitutional Conference, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, Cmnd. 1700 (London: HMSO, 1962), p. 11.

recognized it as separate and unique from the rest of Kenya; and the other Kenya political parties had candidly accepted the separation since they had taken no steps to foster the needs of the people of the Northern Frontier District and had not even visited the area.<sup>2</sup>

Both KANU and KADU, as well as the British Government, realized that to accede to the Somali demands might well be the first step toward the dismemberment of Kenya. The western Galla had strong affiliations with the Galla of Ethiopia; the Masai of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika had common interests; and the Moslem peoples of the coastal area had closer ties to Tanganyika and Zanzibar than to the tribes of the interior. The process of balkanization, once started, could leave Kenya a Kikuyu Nation centered around Nairobi.

The Northern Frontier District delegation not only did not contribute to the drafting of the Constitution, but their intransigence continued to distract the Conference from this, its primary task.

As the Conference drew to a close in early April, Mr. Maulding announced that he had decided to appoint an independent commission to ascertain the wishes of the people in the Northern Frontier District. In a letter addressed to Sir Patrick Renison, the Governor of Kenya, the Northern

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<sup>2</sup>Government of the Somali Republic, The Issue of the Northern Frontier District (Mogadiscio: The Stationery Office, 1963), p. 16.

Frontier District delegation stated that they would have preferred a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations, but that they would accept a commission provided that its findings would be acted upon "concurrently with or prior to the attainment of internal self-government for Kenya." In a press conference following the final plenary session on April 6, Mr. Maulding indirectly answered by stating,

As there is no question of fixing a date for independence, we do not need to decide now the Somali claims regarding the Northern Frontier District. I am setting up some sort of Commission to enquire into the problems and see what people's views are. If it seems wise we will find out their views by a series of plebiscites.<sup>3</sup>

On the same day, following the press conference, an extraordinary session was held between Mr. Maulding and the Northern Frontier District delegation to establish the exact terms of reference for the Commission as they would appear in the Constitutional Conference Report. The wording was designed to satisfy the Northern Frontier District delegation and not offend the KANU and KADU delegations. As a result, the wording was vague enough to satisfy all and provide the British Government with latitude for a later decision.

...the Secretary of State proposes to arrange for an independent Commission to be appointed, with appropriate terms of reference, to investigate this matter and report to him. This Commission will be appointed as soon as practicable so that its report can be available and a decision on its finding taken by Her

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<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

Majesty's Government before the new constitution for Kenya is brought into operation. Meanwhile there will be no change in the status of the Northern Frontier District or in arrangements for its administration.<sup>4</sup>

The Northern Frontier District delegation interpreted this statement as a guarantee that the Commission would be appointed as expediently as possible; and that the decision of the British Government on the disposition of the Northern Frontier District would be based on the Commission's findings.

#### THE SOMALI GOVERNMENT AND THE KENYA CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

The Somali Government also was hopeful about the future of the Northern Frontier District after the appointment of the Northern Frontier District delegation. A special ministerial committee was appointed to advise the Government on the course of action to follow; and Mohammed Ibrahim Egal was appointed to head an unofficial delegation to London to assist and advise the Northern Frontier District delegation.

The Government initially avoided making any official pronouncements in respect to the Northern Frontier District which might have unfavorable repercussions in the Constitutional Conference; but public demonstrations throughout the Republic, particularly in the North, resulted in a group of

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 75.

deputies calling for an extraordinary session of the National Assembly in late March. The first order of business at this session was the introduction of a no-confidence motion by thirty-one members representing both the North and South. The basis of the motion was the alleged lack of courage displayed by the Government in pressing the pan-Somali claims, particularly in reference to the Northern Frontier District.

In a speech delivered on April 6, the Prime Minister made a strong reply to his critics; accused them of treason and affirmed the position of his Government to press the pan-Somali issue, but within the framework of the Constitution.<sup>5</sup>

The no-confidence motion was defeated; but as time passed, and the British did not appoint the promised Commission, the pressure of the ultra-nationalists on the Government increased. Somali inquiries to the British Embassy in Mogadiscio were met with evasive answers. Ethiopian protests to the Foreign Office and renewed fears in both KANU and KADU that separation of the Northern Frontier District would end with the balkanizing of all of Kenya had caused the British to return to Macmillan's 1960 position that this was a problem to be settled between Somalia and Kenya.

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<sup>5</sup>Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Government Activities From Independence Until Today (Mogadiscio: The Stationery Office, 1963), Addresses of the Prime Minister, p. XXVIII.

As part of the second Independence Day celebrations in July 1962, Jomo Kenyatta of KANU and Ronald Ngala of KADU were invited to visit the Republic. Although both visits were conducted in an atmosphere of social cordiality, they failed to bring the Kenyan and Somali attitudes towards the Northern Frontier District into any closer alignment. Both Kenyatta and Ngala stated that it was a domestic issue and would have to be settled in that context. The proposal was advanced that after Kenyan independence the formation of an East African federation should be considered, and that in such a federation the Somali territories would be formed into a single unit. The Somali contention was that cession of the Northern Frontier District should precede federation. The unvoiced problem in the federation question was Ethiopia. Both the Somali and the Kenyans felt that Ethiopia would be essential to the success of such a federation; and both recognized that Haile Selassie would be reluctant to relinquish any of his sovereignty, and certainly would not give up any of his territory. Thus, the meetings ended in a sense of frustration for the Somali and in irritation for the Kenyans.<sup>6</sup>

#### THE COMMISSION REPORTS

In addition to the Northern Frontier District Commission, the Kenya Constitutional Conference Report had

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<sup>6</sup>John Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), pp. 113-121.

authorized two other Commissions, a Regional Boundaries Commission and a Constituencies Delimitation Commission. Both of these Commissions had been appointed in July and were well into their tasks when the long-promised Northern Frontier District Commission was finally appointed in October 1962.

The Regional Boundaries and Constituencies Delimitation Committees were given the responsibility for determining the regional and electoral boundaries for the next Kenya elections. The terms of reference for the Boundaries Commission were:

To divide Kenya into six Regions and the Nairobi Area for the purpose of giving effect to the Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, 1962, and in particular to Appendix II of that Report (Framework of the Kenya Constitution) paying particular attention to:

- (a) the existing boundaries of the Provinces and of the Nairobi Extra-Provincial District; and
- (b) the wishes of the people in any locality to be included in any particular Region or the Nairobi Area.<sup>7</sup>

Since the work of the two Commissions closely coincided, the members decided to work together, holding joint hearings throughout Kenya. They arrived in Nairobi in early August 1962 and held hearings during August and September.

In late August they visited Maralal in the Samburu District of the Northern Frontier District. To both the

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<sup>7</sup>Regional Boundaries Commission, Report of the Regional Boundaries Commission, Cmd. 1899 (London: HMSO, 1962), p. 1.



Northern Frontier District Somali and the Somali Republic, this appeared to be a violation of the Lancaster House Agreement not to change the status of the Northern Frontier District, and demonstrations broke out in both the Northern Frontier District and the Republic.

The Northern Frontier District representatives sent a memorandum to the Governor of Kenya protesting the visits on the basis that the findings of these two Commissions could prejudice the final decision on the Northern Frontier District status. They further noted that if it was the intention of the Kenya Government to include the Northern Frontier District in the new Kenya electoral structure, the people would boycott the forthcoming elections.<sup>8</sup>

KANU attempted to organize a rally of Turkana in Isiolo to build up anti-secessionist support. Pro-secessionist Somali promptly and violently broke up the rally, and in the ensuing riot, twenty-eight people were injured with extensive damage to property. Both Commissions quickly withdrew from the Northern Frontier District and it was decided that in order to preclude further demonstrations and the possibility of intertribal warfare, no more hearings would be held in the Northern Frontier District until after the Northern Frontier District Commission had been appointed and completed its field hearings.

The appointment of the Northern Frontier District

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<sup>8</sup>Government of the Somali Republic, op. cit., p. 30.

Commission on October 5 was obviously a result of the pressure brought to bear by the Northern Frontier District Somali. The Kenya elections were predicated on the other two Commissions finishing their hearings and preparing their reports. Since the members of both Commissions interpreted their terms of reference as including the Northern Frontier District as an integral part of Kenya, though presumably subject to the Northern Frontier District Commission Report, their reports and possibly the elections would be delayed until they were able to hold hearings.

The Northern Frontier District Commission, consisting of G. C. M. Onyiuke of Nigeria and Major General M. P. Bogert of Canada, arrived in Nairobi on October 15 and commenced holding hearings on October 22. Their terms of reference were quite vague and were not made public until the publication of their report.

To ascertain, and report on, public opinion in the Northern Frontier District (comprising the Districts of Isiolo, Garissa, Mandera, Marsabit, Moyale and Wajir) regarding arrangements to be made for the future of the area in the light of the likely course of constitutional development in Kenya.<sup>9</sup>

The Northern Frontier District Commission's hearings were public and were held in all parts of the area. Oral representations were received from 134 delegations and 106 written submissions were made; in all, some 40,000 persons attended the hearings. The two Commissioners completed their

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<sup>9</sup>Northern Frontier Commission, op. cit., p. 1.

mission and returned to London at the end of November.<sup>10</sup>

The members of the other two Commissions returned to Kenya on November 8 and resumed their hearings in the Northern Frontier District where they finished on November 15.<sup>11</sup>

With the three Commissions simultaneously holding hearings in the Northern Frontier District, conditions remained calm and the Somali hopes on both sides of the border were heightened. All of the hearings were held in an atmosphere of cordiality and there were no incidents of hostility towards the Commissioners or of intertribal conflict.

The Boundaries and Constituencies Reports were published in early December, and although it did redraw the boundaries of the Northern Frontier District, it did not excite any particular attention since the Commissioners explained it in the following terms:

...we would have considered it right to create a region consisting of the areas almost exclusively occupied by the Somali and kindred people... Such an arrangement would, we recognize, have simplified the making of some special provision for the administration of this area, if this were considered desirable, pending a decision on its future.

Our terms of reference, however, restricted us to providing six regions, and we concluded that where a choice had to be made the decision must go in favour of giving effect to the wishes of the greater number of

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<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. v.

<sup>11</sup>Regional Boundaries Commission, op. cit., p. 3.

people in Kenya as a whole. For these reasons it was not possible to solve the problem in this way.

After anxious consideration, therefore, we have included the area concerned in the Coast Region. One of the considerations which led us to this decision was that if at any time in the future this area should cease to be a part of Kenya its excision from the Coast Region would not adversely affect the viability of that Region or seriously upset the pattern laid down for Kenya as a whole.<sup>12</sup>

It appeared that the Boundaries Commission had accomplished their task and conveniently left the door open for the cession of the Northern Frontier District, if this is what the Northern Frontier District Commission recommended. The Boundaries Commission had also noted that the Somali delegations seemed to be unanimous in their desire not to be included in any region of Kenya, and that similar representations were being made to the Northern Frontier District Commission. From this, the Somali assumed that the Northern Frontier District Commission would necessarily recommend cession, and that the British Government, in accordance with the Somali interpretation of the Lancaster House Conference, would make the decision before Kenya's independence.

Within days after the publication of the Boundaries Commission Report, the Northern Frontier District Commission Report was published. The Somali were quite surprised at the general nature of the terms of reference, and the statement, "The Commission was purely fact-finding and was not required to make any recommendation as to the future govern-

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<sup>12</sup>Regional Boundaries Commission, op. cit., p. 16.

ment of the Northern Frontier District."<sup>13</sup> Nevertheless, the fact that the Commission's figures indicated that at least 80 percent of the people in the Northern Frontier District were pro-cessionist while the balance were split between pro-Kenyan and "undecided," left little doubt as to the decision of the British.<sup>14</sup>

In early December, just before the publication of the reports, Abdirashid Ali Sharmarki, the Somali Prime Minister, stopped in London on his return from a state visit to the United States. In an informal conference with Prime Minister Macmillan, he explained the Somali position in reference to the Northern Frontier District, emphasizing that any denial by the British Government of self-determination for the people of the Northern Frontier District would be regarded as an unfriendly act. Macmillan stated that the British Government desired to reach an honorable settlement, but that no decisions could be made until the publication of the Commission reports.<sup>15</sup>

Following the publication of the Northern Frontier District Commission Report, Abdirashid Khalif and a Northern Frontier District delegation came to Mogadiscio for consultations with the Somali Government. A special session of the

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<sup>13</sup>Northern Frontier District Commission, op. cit., p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., pp. 11-17.

<sup>15</sup>Government of the Somali Republic, op. cit., p. 47.

National Assembly was called and a motion was passed pledging complete support for the people of the Northern Frontier District. On January 6, 1963, the Somali Government with the concurrence of the Northern Frontier District delegation sent a note to the British Government stating that since the Report indicated the overwhelming desire of the Northern Frontier District Somali to join the Somali Republic, the Somali Government was prepared to assume sovereignty over the region in accordance with the statements made during the Lancaster House Conference, and suggested that a conference be held no later than January 31 to work out the details of the transfer.

This was followed by two more notes on January 17 and 21 protesting the acceptance by the Kenya Council of Ministers of the Boundaries Commission Report, and seeking assurances of Britain's intention to render a decision on the Northern Frontier District prior to the Kenya general elections. On January 23, by aide memoire, the British Ambassador informed Abdirashid that no final decision on the Northern Frontier District was contemplated in the near future; and that the Boundaries Commission's Report would not prejudice the decision when it was made. Abdirashid informed the British Ambassador on January 26 and February 5 that he did not consider the answer satisfactory and that at the least he expected a formal reply to his notes of January 6, 17, and 21 and an explanation as to why the

January 6 proposal did not meet British approval.

On February 11, another exchange of communications took place. The British Ambassador assured the Somali Government that they would be consulted before any final decision was made; that in view of these assurances, no formal answer to the January notes was deemed necessary; and, that the elections in Kenya would not prejudice the final Northern Frontier District settlement. Abdirashid immediately replied by cable directly to Prime Minister Macmillan protesting that the implementation of the Boundaries Commission's Report and the holding of elections under the new Constitution would be violations of the Lancaster House Conference assurances in respect to both the status and administration of the Northern Frontier District. He further stated, "the only way in which Her Majesty's Government could avoid an outright and public charge of breach of faith would be to postpone all forthcoming elections in the Northern Frontier District (but not in Kenya proper)."<sup>16</sup>

Macmillan's reply was received on February 23 and it stated, "The decision referred to to make no change in the status of the Northern Frontier District<sup>7</sup> related solely to action which, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, should be taken as a result of the Commission's findings. There was no understanding that the decision would relate to the final constitutional arrangements for the Northern Frontier

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<sup>16</sup>Ibid., p. 53.

District." He also repeated the assurances that the new Kenya Constitution would not prejudice the ultimate Northern Frontier District decision; that the Somali Government would be given an opportunity to express its views; and that consultations would precede the independence constitution being put into effect.<sup>17</sup> The Lancaster House assurances had been inserted during the extraordinary session between Mr. Maulding and the Northern Frontier District delegation to insure that the Northern Frontier District's future would be decided before the new Constitution went into effect and Kenya received internal autonomy. They had assumed that the Northern Frontier District Commission's terms of reference would be more specific, and that its findings would be binding. It now appeared that the British decision on the Commission's findings was going to be to do nothing, and since their interpretation of the Lancaster House assurances was that nothing would be done before the decision on the Commission's findings, the Somali had been caught in a net of double-talk in which they had gained absolutely nothing.

On March 6, 1963, the Somali Ambassador to Great Britain and the Consul-General in Nairobi were recalled for consultation and an emergency session of the National Assembly was called. Violence broke out both in the Northern

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<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 56.



Frontier District and throughout the Somali Republic not only against the British but also the Americans, Ethiopians, and French as well. Demands were made in the National Assembly that the Somali Government immediately break relations with all Western Powers.

The British Government announced that on March 8 Duncan Sandys, Mr. Maulding's successor as Secretary of State, would render a decision on the Northern Frontier District Commission Report in Nairobi. There was a sense of relief in Mogadiscio and a renewed optimism that possibly the British had made an eleventh-hour decision favorable to the Somali. Mr. Sandys referred to the statement in the Boundaries Commission's Report, previously quoted, in which they recognized the requirement, or at least the desirability, of a separate Somali district and the reasons why they had not recommended one. He went on to say, "Her Majesty's Government have now decided that, as part of the constitutional arrangements for internal self-government in Kenya, the predominantly Somali areas should be formed into a separate seventh region enjoying a status equal to that of other regions of Kenya."<sup>18</sup>

#### SEVERING OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

In the closing words of his speech, Mr. Sandys precluded any possibility of the Northern Frontier District's

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 67.

joining the Somali Republic before Kenyan independence.

Addressing the people of the Northern Frontier District he said

I hope that whatever may be their anxieties and their doubts, the Somali people, when they get experience of the new self-governing Kenya, will find that Kenya is a good place to live in and a country in which they have an honourable and advantageous part to play.<sup>19</sup>

The government of Abdirashid Ali Sharmarki was in a vulnerable position; having defeated the no-confidence motion by the more extreme pan-Somali members of the National Assembly barely a year previously, his government had relied heavily on the successful outcome of the negotiations with the British. Staying within the framework of the Constitution, and employing accepted diplomatic procedures, the government had hoped to demonstrate to the ultra-nationalists that Greater Somalia could be realized without force, and without antagonizing her neighbors.

On March 11, the National Assembly was reconvened in an emergency session and on March 14, by a vote of 70 to 14, a Resolution to break relations with Great Britain was passed. Relations were formally broken on March 18 and a week later, the British Embassy Staff withdrew.

There were many strong personal regrets on the part of both members of the Somali Government and the British Embassy Staff. Most Somali officials felt that Ambassador Pyman and his staff had genuinely worked for the Somali

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<sup>19</sup>Loc. cit.

interest, and in turn, the British had enjoyed cordial relations with the various Somali officials with whom they worked. In addition, the Somali lost some four million dollars per year in aid as well as a small military assistance program.

In its simplest context, Somalia was the odd man out in a three-way game. To cede the Northern Frontier District to Somalia would have meant the sacrificing of a long-standing and valuable British friendship with Ethiopia, and would have endangered the very existence of the new Commonwealth territory of Kenya. This was a price too high for the retention of the Anglo-Somali relationship which in practical terms offered little return and was largely based on a paternal feeling stemming from a long-time interest in the area.

The whole problem was why the Macmillan Government vacillated on the question. At the time independence was granted to British Somaliland, a clear position statement was made in respect to the pan-Somali concept. Prior to the Lancaster House Meetings, the Somali Government and the Northern Frontier District Somali had stated their goals and aspirations quite succinctly; during the Lancaster House negotiations, and particularly at the extraordinary session, there could have been no doubt on the part of the British as to the exact goals and desires of the Somali; and even the working of the three Commission Reports reflected a clear understanding of Somali attitudes. It is probable that

if the Macmillan Government frankly and consistently had maintained their expressed position of 1960, the Somali would not have been pleased but their hopes would not have been raised and the ensuing conflict might have been avoided.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE NORTHERN FRONTIER DISTRICT ISSUE AND SOMALI FOREIGN RELATIONS

#### GENERAL

Defeat on the Northern Frontier District issue marked a turning point in Somali foreign affairs, not only in respect to Great Britain but also throughout the entire spectrum of its relations with other nations. The pan-Somali concept became the frame of reference in which every aspect of Somali foreign relations was determined.

Having counseled moderation and circumspection in pressing the issue, and having been embarrassed, humiliated, and defeated, the Abdirashid Government was now forced to take a strong line on the entire problem or risk being defeated and replaced by a more radical regime. The evidence of this change was not long in coming, and the result was the isolation of the Somali Republic from the rest of Africa and a departure from a policy of positive neutralism toward a pro-Egyptian-Communist Bloc posture.

#### ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

In pan-African affairs, the Somali Republic had been a member of the moderate Monrovia Group, organized in the capital of Liberia in May 1961 by the twelve original members of the Brazzaville Group and seven additional states. The

basic concept of the Monrovia Group was moderation and progress through continuing cooperation with England, France, the United States, and other advanced nations. Although identified with and participating in the affairs of this Group, the Somali identified themselves more with the member states from North Africa, i.e., Libya and Tunisia, and the other Arab nations, rather than with Africa south of the Sahara.

The first continent-wide consultation of African leaders in Addis Ababa in May 1963 from which the Organization of African Unity emerged, appeared to the Somali Government as a fortuitous opportunity to gain African support for the pan-Somali concept, and particularly for the Northern Frontier District claims. The Somali delegation was headed by President Aden Abdulla Osman who delivered the Somali Government's address to the Conference. In his speech, the President stressed the need for a permanent conciliation and arbitration commission. He went on to state that the African States should not accept as final and binding the colonial boundaries which they had inherited. Based on this theme, he moved specifically to the Somali problem, and in an emotion-charged statement condemned the countries responsible for the Somali separation, including the host country Ethiopia.

The effect of this outburst was exactly the opposite of what the Somali delegation had intended and anticipated. Most of the delegates were offended by this attack on the

host country, and deeply resented the injection of this partisan problem into the efforts to reach a common accord. Moreover, the question of colonial boundaries was an extremely sensitive one; and more than one African nation looked on it as a Pandora's Box which they could not afford to have opened.

Instead of gaining support, the Somalis had antagonized all of the African powers, even those who previously had at least extended sympathy. Somalia's identification with pan-Africanism having thus failed, it was evident that she would have to turn elsewhere for support.

#### MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND THE ROME CONFERENCE

The situation in the Northern Frontier District deteriorated rapidly after Sandys' speech. The Somali imposed a total boycott on the March elections with no candidates being nominated. As a result, the three districts of the new Northeastern Region were not represented, and since the Constitution did not provide for this contingency, they were placed under the direct administration of the Governor. In the three western districts where the population was mixed, anti-secessionists did register, and because of the Somali boycott their candidates were largely unopposed. In this area, there were increasing incidents of violence and the elections had to be postponed twice. They were finally held with the polls under close military guard.

Raids of Somali shifta (bandits) into the non-Somali border areas intensified, and it became increasingly evident that they were no longer simple looting raids but were now guerrilla-type terrorist operations calculated to frighten the anti-secessionists and disrupt the British administrative activities. The announcement that Kenya would become independent on December 12 incited even further violence. The British retaliated by taking NPPPP leaders into administrative custody, and by rounding up non-Kenyan Somalis and turning them back over the border.

After the Addis Ababa meeting in May 1963, Somali-Ethiopian border clashes also increased in frequency and intensity. Somali shifta harassed Ethiopian military units in the Ogaden, and the Ethiopian Army retaliated by attacking Somali villages. As refugees streamed into the northern part of the Republic, tensions mounted. Complaints were filed with the American Embassy that military assistance materiel provided to the Ethiopians by the United States was being used against innocent villagers and nomads.

During Abdirashid's Washington visit in the fall of 1962, President Kennedy had promised a military assistance program for Somalia. No amount was specifically mentioned, and because of the Northern Frontier District crisis and the objections to such a program on the part of Ethiopia, negotiations lagged. Ethiopia was finally convinced that since Somalia would obtain military assistance from somewhere,



it would be in their interest to have the United States be the supplier. On their part, the Somali anticipated a program comparable to the one provided to Ethiopia. When the negotiations got underway in late April, the American offer was some 2.5 million dollars in aid over a five-year period, aimed primarily at giving the Somali army the capability to carry out civic action programs, e.g., increased engineer construction capability, medical training and equipment, etc. This was to be coordinated with programs sponsored by West Germany and Italy which would bring the total to 11 million dollars for the five-year period. This contrasted markedly with the 67.5 million dollars in military assistance provided Ethiopia by the United States alone between 1946 and 1962.

The Somali were disappointed with the small size of the program in its failure to improve the armament of the Somali army and in the standard clause in American military assistance agreements, prohibiting concurrent acceptance of Communist Bloc military aid. The Somali officials felt that the only intention of the United States was to keep them in a position of inferiority to Ethiopia. General Daud Abdulla Hersi, the Somali Army Commandant, expressed it to the author in the following terms:

You have given Ethiopia the largest and best-equipped army in Africa. The only possible enemy for the Ethiopians are we Somali, and since you have armed them, you have forced us to arm also. Now you offer us a program so small, and so restrictive in its requirements

that if we accept it, we can never defend ourselves.<sup>1</sup>

Negotiations continued into the summer. Tensions again eased when the British invited the Somali Government to meet with a British-Kenya delegation in Rome on August 25, 1963 for further discussions on the Northern Frontier District in the light of Kenya's pending independence. Somali hopes were again raised that the British would take this opportunity to abide by the Somali interpretation of the Lancaster House Conference and grant the cession of the Northern Frontier District prior to Kenyan independence.

At the opening meeting, the British delegation offered the following basis of agreement:

1. Primary consideration will be given to the welfare of the inhabitants of the Northeastern Region.

2. Agreement shall be sought by peaceful and lawful means and all concerned will cooperate to reduce tension in the area.

3. Her Majesty's Government will take no unilateral decision involving a change in the frontiers of Kenya before independence.

4. With these points in mind

- A. The Kenya Government recognised the interest of Somalia in the future of any people of Somali origin residing in Kenya.

- B. The Somali Government and the Kenya Government taking into account previous contacts, will resume discussions at an early date to be agreed.

- C. If these discussions do not result in agreement the Kenya Government will be free after Kenya's independence to bring the matter to the notice of African States within the spirit of the Addis Ababa resolutions.

- D. The Government of Kenya, in consultation with Her Majesty's Government, are actively considering what further steps should be taken to provide for the

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<sup>1</sup> Author's notes.



particular needs of the inhabitants of the area.<sup>2</sup>

To the Somali delegation, this did not appear to be any change in the British position from that existing at the time diplomatic relations were broken. In hope of achieving something from the meeting, they made the following counter-proposals:

The whole of the Northern Frontier District with its six districts being the disputed area, should be placed under a special administration. Such administration should be either

- (i) A joint Somalia/Kenya administration, or
- (ii) placed under United Nations administration.

If these proposals are agreeable to the U.K. delegation, the Somali Government is willing to enter into negotiation at an early date with all interested parties in order to achieve a final and satisfactory solution to this problem.<sup>3</sup>

It soon became evident that the positions presented by each side were more in terms of ultimatums than starting points for negotiations. The meetings remained deadlocked, and on August 29 both sides issued final communiques to the effect that no basis for agreement could be reached.

Abdirashid refused Jomo Kenyatta's offer to stop in Nairobi on the way back from Rome for further discussions. Instead, he accepted an invitation from Mao Tse-tung to pay a state visit to Communist China. While in Peking,

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<sup>2</sup>Government of the Somali Republic, The Somali Republic and the Organization of African Unity (Mogadiscio: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1965), p. 562.

<sup>3</sup>Loc. cit.

he signed the Chinese-Somali Agreement which included a long-term, interest-free loan of 20 million in Swiss francs, and a gift of 3 million to help offset the loss of British financial aid.<sup>4</sup>

In November, the Somali Government announced that it was refusing the Western offers of military aid, and was accepting an offer from the Soviet Union of some 31 million dollars in assistance. Unlike the Three-Power gift offer, the Soviet's offer was in the form of a long-term, low-interest loan. In addition to its size, from the Somali view it had the advantage of including modern jet aircraft and armor, both of which the Ethiopians had, and both of which are essential to warfare on terrain such as Somalia's.

#### KENYAN INDEPENDENCE AND WAR WITH ETHIOPIA

With Kenyan independence on December 12, 1963, direct diplomatic relations between the two countries were established, but representation was not exchanged. The Somali Government was still maintaining the position that its quarrel was not with Kenya or the Kenyans but with the British; a somewhat ambivalent position in view of the unalterable opposition Kenyan representatives had repeatedly expressed on the question of Northern Frontier District secession, and the fact that this opposition had largely influenced Britain's stand on the question.

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<sup>4</sup>Presidency of the Council of Ministers, op. cit., p.49.

Ethiopia and Kenya had signed a mutual defense pact in July to become effective with Kenya's independence. This pact was obviously aimed at Somalia and was another factor contributing to the growing Somali sense of isolation. The Somali-Ethiopian situation had continued to deteriorate, and in early February 1964 open warfare broke out between Somali and Ethiopian armed forces at several points along the border. Fighting continued until February 18 when at the request of the Council of Ministers of the Organization for African Unity, who were meeting in an extraordinary session at Dares-Salaam, a truce was arranged.

The period of the Ethiopian conflict was marked by increased guerrilla activity in the Northern Frontier District as well as anti-American and anti-French demonstrations.

When the regular conference of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity convened on February 24 in Lagos, two resolutions were adopted in respect to the Somali situation: one called for direct negotiations between Somalia and Kenya with a view to finding a peaceful and lasting solution to the differences between them; and the other requested Somalia and Ethiopia to maintain the cease-fire and to open as soon as possible direct negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful solution to their territorial dispute.<sup>5</sup> The Somali and Ethiopian delegates opened

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<sup>5</sup>Europa Publishing Co., The Middle East and North Africa 1966-67 (London: Europa Pub. Co., Ltd., 1967), p. 563.

dialogue on the question, but the Ethiopians laid down conditions that the border should be closed to Somali nomads; the basis for negotiation should be the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1908; and that the OAU should ask both countries to renounce all territorial claims.<sup>6</sup> The Somali delegation was not willing to accept these conditions, and the talks broke down.

Fighting resumed along the border with less intensity than before but with indications that unless some settlement was reached, it would be an inconclusive and protracted conflict. Soviet arms had not yet arrived in Somalia in any quantity, and there was the fear that Kenya might make it a two-front war at any moment, so the Somali appealed to the members of the OAU to offer their good offices. Sudan, Ghana, Morocco, and Tanganyika sent special envoys to each country, and a bilateral meeting was arranged in Khartoum.

On March 23 at Khartoum, a truce was agreed to under the following terms:

(a) The re-affirmation of the resolutions adopted by the Council of Ministers of the O.A.U. at Dar es Salaam and Lagos.

(b) The determination of the two Governments to maintain cease-fire alongside the border.

(c) The withdrawal of their military forces to a distance between 10 to 15 Km. from either side of the border. Such withdrawal to start April 1, 1964 and to be completed by April 6, 1964.

(d) The appointment of a Joint Commission composed of representatives of the two Governments to ensure the complete withdrawal of the military forces.

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<sup>6</sup>Loc. cit.

(e) The cessation of all hostile propaganda through all media of information from April 2, 1964.<sup>7</sup>

#### ATTEMPTS TO SETTLE THE DISPUTE

In regard to the Lagos Conference recommendation on the Kenya-Somalia dispute, the first step was taken on March 28 when Jomo Kenyatta sent a letter to the Somali Government stating that Kenya would welcome early discussions on the border incidents in order to prevent further deterioration of the situation.

The first post-independence elections for the National Assembly were scheduled for March 30, and since the future of the Abdirashid Government was in doubt, it was decided that no answer would be made until after the election results were complete. On May 17, Kenya was notified by Abdirashid that the Somali Republic would begin negotiations as soon as the new Government was formed.

Abdirashid resigned on June 7 and on June 14 a new Government was formed under Abdirizak Haji Hussein. On June 29, the Abdirizak Government proposed that since the Cairo Summit Conference was about to convene, the bilateral talks should be held in Cairo on July 10 to discuss preliminaries for a later meeting to be held between the two Governments. The Kenya Government made a counterproposal setting the date for July 15 which the Somali Government

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<sup>7</sup>Government of the Somali Republic, op. cit., p. 9.

accepted. On July 14, the National Assembly under the leadership of the Abdirashid faction passed a vote of no confidence in the newly-formed Government. As a result of this internal political crisis, the Kenya talks were indefinitely postponed.

Under the Somali Constitution obligations or commitments binding the State can only be undertaken by a Government having the confidence of the National Assembly. On July 21, the OAU passed a resolution by acclamation in which all member States pledged themselves to respect the frontiers existing on their achievement of national independence. Under the constitutional provisions of the Somali Republic, Ahmed Yusuf Dualah, the Abdirizak Government's Foreign Minister, was without authority at the Cairo Conference except as an observer and he refrained from voting on the Boundaries Resolution. Prior to the passage of the Resolution, President Aden Abdulla Osman had notified President Nasser that the Somali would reject any such Resolution. In any case, constitutionally as President, he did not have the power to make any binding commitments.

The rejection of this Resolution, plus Somali objections to the designation of Addis Ababa as the permanent seat of the OAU, served to further alienate the Somali from the other African States.

On August 14, Abdirizak again formed a government, and a vote of confidence was received on September 29.



Western observers had hoped that the new Government might be more moderate, and in its initial formation in June it had given indications of being so. The policies announced prior to the vote of confidence indicated that it would be more militant in every respect, particularly on the Greater Somalia problem, than its predecessor had been.

No efforts were made to open bilateral talks with Kenya, and the publication of a new Constitution for Kenya in December increased the tensions. The intractable attitude of the Northern Frontier District Somali toward the Kenya Government; and their refusal to participate in the Central Government or to form local governments, had forced Kenya to modify its constitutional provisions for the Northern Frontier District. Changes were incorporated which crystallized the provisional arrangements previously made. The Somali Government protested that these new provisions deprived the Northern Frontier District Somali of what autonomy they had possessed, and renewed its demands for political self-determination for the Northern Frontier District.

During the Ethiopian border war in 1964, the Somali Government had armed the tribesmen out of the excess weapons in its arsenals. The arrival of Soviet shipments of small arms increased the number of weapons available by making the mixture of British, Italian, and Egyptian small arms, with which the Army had previously been equipped, surplus. Much

of this surplus found its way into tribesmen's hands. How much of this was official policy, and how much was individual action, is difficult to determine. General Daud Abdulla Hersi, the Somali Army Commandant, a pro-Western moderate, died of cancer in a Moscow hospital on April 16, 1965 and was replaced by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Siad. Siad is an anti-Western Somali activist with strong Egyptian connections. After Daud's death, guerrilla activity against Kenya intensified both in extent and violence.

By mid-summer 1965, much of the Northern Frontier District was under military administration; the cost to the Kenya Government was running close to 140 thousand dollars per month, and the situation was steadily deteriorating.<sup>8</sup> In an effort to try and simplify the policing task, Kenya instituted a policy of concentration villages or manyattas. The Northern Frontier District Somali were brought into these villages and retained under close guard. Grazing of livestock was permitted in certain specified areas in the vicinity, but the previous nomadic patterns were not allowed. Any Somali outside of the designated area was subject to arrest and confiscation of his stock. This policy caused an influx of refugees into Somalia and the Ogaden area of Ethiopia, creating problems in both areas. Kenya's control over the nomads was simplified, but the resentment

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<sup>8</sup> Gilbert Ware, "Somalia: From Trust Territory to Nation, 1950-1960," Phylon, Vol. 26, Summer 1965, p. 183.

of the Somalis was increased, and with it the violence of resistance escalated.

In November 1965, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania offered his good offices to the Somali and Kenyan Governments. A meeting was arranged at Arusha in Northern Tanzania between Aden Abdulla Osman and Jomo Kenyatta. Since the position of neither country had undergone a material change on the issue, the meeting was foredoomed. On December 13, two days after the meeting convened, Kenyatta announced that since there was no basis for discussion, the meeting was adjourned.<sup>9</sup>

In early 1966, Kenya and Ethiopia organized a joint committee to coordinate action against the Somali shifita. The Somali Government still denied that any material support was being provided to the insurgents or that they were trained or based in Somalia. With Kenya and Somalia now close to open warfare, and a military solution appearing to be the only way out, Kenya broke off diplomatic relations.

On June 26, the Abdirizak Government submitted its resignation. A coalition of Abdirashid forces and Opposition members mustered enough strength to defeat two minor internal measures introduced by the Government. Although it did not constitute a no-confidence vote, it did indicate that the more moderate forces were eroding the

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<sup>9</sup>The New York Times, Dec. 14, 1965, p. 20.

Government's position. Aden Abdullah Osman refused the resignation and urged Abdirizak to seek a vote of confidence. The Opposition could not muster enough strength to defeat the Government in an open test of strength.<sup>10</sup> The sixth anniversary parade found Abdirizak still in power, and was celebrated by a parade of the Soviet-supplied military equipment.

#### FRENCH SOMALILAND PLEBISCITE

In August, President DeGaulle visited Djibouti and unexpectedly was met with violent anti-French, pro-Somali riots. After his departure, he declared that a referendum would be held in the spring of 1967 to determine the future status of French Somaliland. This somewhat changed the focal point of Somali Nationalist attentions. Guerrilla operations continued in the Northern Frontier District, but the official government attention was primarily directed toward Djibouti and toward preparation for the likely eventuality of open conflict with Ethiopia in the event French Somaliland voted for independence. As the elections, scheduled for March 19, 1967, neared, both Ethiopia and Somalia moved heavy troop reenforcements to the border area. In the month preceding the election, French officials made frequent sweeps through the country checking identification

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<sup>10</sup>The New York Times, June 28, 1966, p. 10.

papers and imprisoning or deporting Somalis without proper documents. Reporters on the scene and some Somali experts have strongly questioned the impartiality of the plebiscite.<sup>11</sup> When the votes were counted, the choice was to remain with France. Conflict with Ethiopia was averted, but the Greater Somalia dream had been dealt another blow.

### THE NEW LOOK

Preparations for the first post-independence presidential election were conducted in an atmosphere of gloom by the faction backing Aden Abdullah Osman for reelection and guarded optimism by the Opposition. The final blow to President Aden's hopes was Israel's decisive victory in the Six-Day War. The failure of the Soviets to come to the assistance of the Arab Nations, as well as the resounding and rapid defeat of Egypt, gave the Somali reasons to reflect on the wisdom of their alliances with, and dependence on, these two powers. The closure of the Suez Canal and the Soviet decision to rearm the Arab Nations also cut off the flow of support to the Somali Army, leaving the country vulnerable to attack from either Kenya or Ethiopia or both in concert.

The Suez closure also cut the Somali off from their banana market in Italy at a time when foreign exchange was

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<sup>11</sup>I. M. Lewis, "The Referendum in French Somaliland," The World Today, Vol. 23, July 1967, p. 308.

badly needed to offset the effects of a severe drought the previous year. This, too, could be blamed on the improvidence of their erstwhile friends, neither of whom could or would offer any amelioration for the Somali losses.

On June 12, after the required three ballots, the National Assembly, under the leadership of Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, elected Abdirashid Ali Shirmarke the second President of the Republic. Abdirashid appointed Mohammed Ibrahim Egal as the new Prime Minister and gave him the task of forming a moderate government which could establish rapport with Kenya and Ethiopia, help the country out of its financial crisis, reestablish relations with Great Britain and improve relations with the other Western nations, and moderate the Nation's position vis-a-vis the Bloc Nations and Egypt. The Somali foreign policy was to be based on identity with Africa south of the Sahara rather than with the Arab Nations, and neutrality in respect to the cold war.

Mohammed Ibrahim immediately reduced the Army by three thousand men and asked the Soviets to remove the majority of their military advisory staff. These actions served the double purpose of improving the financial position of the country and providing a gesture of good will towards Kenya and Ethiopia. To further ease the financial strain, an emergency loan was obtained from the World Bank and negotiations were undertaken with the two

Italian firms handling Somali bananas to undertake a joint operation shipping by high-speed reefer vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. The shipments made by this route arrived in Italy with only two more days of transit time than required for shipments through the Suez Canal and were in so much better condition that the additional shipping costs were more than offset.

On October 28, 1967, Mohammed Ibrahim and Jomo Kenyatta met in Arushia, Tanzania with Kenneth D. Kaunda of Zambia acting as mediator and Julius Nyrere and Milton Obote as observers. Agreement was reached to restore diplomatic relations between Somalia and Kenya; to cease the propaganda war and raiding between the two Nations; and suspend the emergency regulations which had been placed into effect on both sides of the border. A working committee of representatives from Somalia, Kenya, and Zambia was established to work out the details and provide liaison.<sup>12</sup>

The success of the talks between Mohammed Ibrahim and Jomo Kenyatta, as contrasted with the failure of previous talks in December 1965 between Aden Abdullah Osman and Kenyatta, can be credited to several factors: Kenneth Kaunda is more moderate than Julius Nyrere, and at the time of the 1965 talks there was tension between Kenya and Tanzania over the smuggling of arms from Tanzania into Kenya, reducing

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<sup>12</sup>The New York Times, October 29, 1967, p. 3.

Nyrere's value as a mediator; Mohammed Ibrahim has consistently been more moderate on the Greater Somalia question, at times, seemingly sacrificing his political career to maintain this position; both Mohammed Ibrahim and Jomo Kenyatta have backgrounds of British education and training; and both countries were finding the financial strain of the conflict increasingly difficult to bear.

The normalizing of relations with Kenya paved the way for the restoration of relations with Great Britain which was accomplished the following month. The British partially restored their aid program and instituted an extensive scholarship program.

When Vice-President Humphrey visited Somalia as part of his African tour in January 1968, it had been anticipated that this would be one of the most difficult stops on his itinerary. Contrary to expectation, he was well received. Mohammed Ibrahim's return visit to the United States in March was marked by an equal warmth and cordiality.

Somali-Ethiopian relationships have also improved in the wake of the Kenya detent. Although there was never an official break in relations such as what occurred with Kenya, the antipathy between the two peoples is much deeper, and as previously noted has a much longer history. Haile Selassie, in his self-appointed role as elder statesman of Africa south of the Sahara and out of fear of Somalia-Kenya rapport isolating Ethiopia, has been forced to follow suit.



The border areas of both Kenya and Ethiopia are now being policed by joint patrols with Somali police and district commissioners in the border provinces are working together to solve their mutual problems. Plans are being drawn up to connect Mogadiscio, Nairobi, and Addis Ababa with a modern highway net; mutual overflight and landing privileges have been granted by each nation to the national airlines of the others; and trade agreements are being re-drafted to encourage area economic development.

## CHAPTER V

### THE FUTURE: POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES

#### GENERAL

A solution to the problem of the Somali irredenta is essential to the peace and future development of East Africa. To be successful, the solution must account for conditions, economic, political, and social, as they are, not solely as they ideally should be. Idealism has a role to play in the ultimate goal to be achieved, but the inception of the solution must be firmly founded on reality.

Rupert Emerson has stated,

It is against both logic and history to believe that peoples can generally be counted on to abide by the result of a vote when they deny that the majority has any moral claim on them. The great issues of nationalism and self-determination have been settled not by genteel processes of votes and majorities but by the revolutionary rising of peoples and the successful waging of wars, which have carried history with them.<sup>1</sup>

This has been the course of events up to the present in the Northern Frontier District. The four years of conflict between the Somali and Kenya have cost the lives of an estimated three thousand people, and have brought untold hardship and permanent economic loss to thousands more; both Nations have expended vital resources badly needed to develop other sectors of their national structure; and the

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<sup>1</sup>Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 331.

problem has not been resolved within the context of armed conflict. It is now evident to a sufficiently significant sector of the peoples involved that a solution by force of arms will not resolve the problem. It may be, as Emerson says, "against both logic and history," but for the moment at least, the majority of the Somali appear to be ready to accept a solution which may subordinate or at least attenuate their nationalist aspirations.

#### FACTORS AFFECTING A SOLUTION

Aside from the nationalist aspirations of the Somali, which still remains the crux of any solution, there are other factors which must be considered in any course of action undertaken. These factors can be broadly categorized as political factors within the Somali Republic, economic factors, and internal factors in Kenya and Ethiopia.

In respect to the internal politics of the Somali Republic, it should be noted that the current detente is the result of the outcome of the French Somaliland referendum and the Arab-Israeli War. The future of Mohammed Ibrahim Egal's Government is predicated on the General Assembly elections scheduled for the spring of 1969, and this in turn will depend on both the continued absence of crises which can be attributed by the Opposition directly or indirectly to his policies during the interim, and some show of progress

on the part of his regime towards a solution to the pan-Somali question.

Many of the Somali Nationalists are deeply involved in Soviet and Egyptian schemes; some in the sincere belief that this is the true destiny of the Somali people; some in the cynical, opportunistic hope that somehow they can achieve their nationalistic goals without becoming too embroiled; and some in the hope of personal aggrandizement and power. The balance between these and the moderates is maintained by an uncommitted group who give their support to the position which appears to have the best chance of success. Position in this respect is unrelated to party affiliation; all three persuasions are found in all political parties. The coalition Mohammed Ibrahim has welded together is based on this extremely frangible relationship.

There is little danger of a coup bringing down a Somali Government. The police force and the Army counter-balance each other, precluding the use of either as a coup device; and together, they are strong enough to control any para-military insurgency. The defeat of the Government by legitimate parliamentary procedure is, however, an ever present possibility.

Economic weakness coupled with the irredenta problem has provided an entry-point for the Soviet Union into Somali affairs. The aid received from the Soviet Union has been quite comprehensive in the nature of the projects undertaken,

and the impact has probably been greater than anywhere else in Africa. Unlike many Soviet Union aid programs, the one in Somalia has avoided prestige-type projects instead, meeting basic economic and social needs. In addition, the projects have been completed on relatively tight time schedules. Non-Soviet Union projects on the other hand have not been nearly so successful. Many have been poorly conceived and have not been completed on schedule.

Economic independence and a commensurate diminution of outside influence in Somali affairs would materially assist in reducing tensions in the irredenta problem and facilitate its solution in a purely African context. Recent developments have materially changed the potential in this respect. A United Nations' geological survey just completed has discovered mineral wealth sufficient to make the country not only economically independent but wealthy. The survey revealed: a surface deposit of over 100 million tons of high-grade iron ore; one of the largest and richest surface deposits of uranium in the world; an extensive sulfur deposit which will permit the uranium ore to be refined in-country; and extensive deposits of rare earths, bauxite, and gypsum. American and West European firms are currently bidding for development rights and the Somali Government has imposed the condition on the bidding that the successful firm must develop all of the deposits on a balanced basis; not solely the uranium and rare earths. The extensive oil

explorations which have been conducted by American, British, and Italian firms since World War II are also beginning to bear fruit with the discovery of exploitable gas fields.

In addition to the mineral wealth, American firms have started fishery operations for tuna, shrimp, and lobster, all of which are readily available in large quantity. West German firms are also working with Somali interests in an effort to develop a textile industry in the inter-riverine area.<sup>2</sup>

Realization of even a portion of this economic potential should give Somalia the opportunity for financial independence necessary for the development of true political independence. At the same time, if its markets are Western oriented, it is likely that its foreign policy will be also, or at least will remain more within the range of neutralism as visualized by Mohammed Ibrahim.

The third set of factors, internal conditions within Ethiopia and Kenya, have already been touched on in earlier portions of this paper.

Ethiopia has, because of its gallant stand against Italy, become an idealized symbol of Africa to much of the Western world. Haile Selassie's efforts to exert leadership over the pan-African movement and his role as mediator in

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<sup>2</sup>Information on these economic developments has not been widely publicized. The author's sources are official and are unimpeachable, but cannot be directly quoted or credited.

intra-African disputes have further enhanced this picture. In truth, Ethiopia is essentially an island of Byzantine culture ruled by an absolute monarch. Evidences of modernization are largely a facade, limited to Eritrea, for which the credit must go primarily to the Italians and to the capital city of Addis Ababa. Behind this facade there is a growing elite of Westernized, educated youth, impatient with the conservative traditional aristocracy and eager for modernization; there are the Somali of the Ogaden anxious to join the Somali Republic; there are the Eritreans in open rebellion to gain independence; there are the Muslim Galla plotting and fighting to be free of Amheric dominance; and there are the Muslims in the Sudan border region whose allegiance is to the Sudan. Hegemony over this trouble is largely maintained by Haile Selassie through the strength of his large, American-equipped armed forces. Through their loyalty, the abortive palace revolution of 1960 was put down, and through their strength, the dissident elements have been kept under tight reign. This rigid structure is not amenable to change. Any accomodation of Somali aspirations would shatter the entire fabric. There is little hope for a peaceful resolution after the Emperor's death; peaceful transfer of rule is not in the Ethiopian tradition. Historically, rival claimants to the throne have gathered followers and fought until one gained sufficient strength to impose his rule. There is little doubt that the educated,

Westernized leaders will be one of the elements contending for power, and if they are the victors, the rigidity of the deeply-rooted traditionalism may be shattered.

The situation in Kenya is considerably different in most respects and yet, remarkably similar. The domestic stability of Kenya lies in maintaining its colonial borders intact, at least for the time being. Although not a federation in the sense that Nigeria was; it is a federation in fact. Within its borders there is a wide diversity of peoples who have ties and loyalties extending beyond its geographic boundaries and who have ancient animosities toward each other.

The ruling elements of Kenya are largely drawn from the Kikuyu, the inhabitants of the central plateau, while the coastal areas are inhabited by the Moslem tribes with close ties to Zanzibar and the continental coastal area of Tanzania. The northern region is inhabited by the Turkana with traditional ties to Uganda, the Galla who extended into southern Ethiopia, and the Somali. Between the Kikuyu and the northern people, there are the Masai. The Kenya Government and the political parties upon which it is based, are exerting every effort to break down this tribalism, and bring to the people the nationalism of being Kenyans. This program is succeeding remarkably well but it is not yet strong enough to withstand the traumatic effect that cession of a separatist element such as the Somali would impose.



Total dismemberment or balkanization would most probably follow.

### ALTERNATIVES

Maintenance of the status quo. The ideal solution from the point of view of Somalia's neighbors would be an indefinite extension of the present detente with an eventual normalizing of relations along existing territorial lines. This would require the nations in which the irredenta are located to undertake programs to "de-Somalize" the inhabitants, and to integrate them into the social, economic, and political life of the country.

In the case of the Northern Frontier District, the manyatta system instituted by Kenya to control the Somali has seemingly changed the nomadic patterns. Contrary to the expectations of anthropologists and Somali experts, since the Kenya Government lifted the restrictions, the majority of the people have continued to live in the village areas. The men move the herds out to pasturage and water, while the women and children remain behind. The reasons for this radical change seem to be the availability of educational and medical facilities in the villages and the discovery on the part of the Somali women of the advantages of fixed communal living. The Kenya Government on its part is fostering this change by intensive efforts to improve the water supply and pasturage in the vicinity of the villages to the degree required to support the herds, and to increase further

the number and quality of services available in the villages.

For the Kenya project to be successful, similar programs will have to be undertaken in both Ethiopia and the Somali Republic to prevent seasonal migrations into the improved areas of Kenya. It does appear from the Kenya experiment that the traditional nomadic patterns can be broken, but it is unlikely that, in the terms of the present detente, either Somalia or Ethiopia will undertake similar programs. In the case of Ethiopia, the resources required for such a program would be so great that it is doubtful that adequate support could or would be given. In the case of Somalia, it is too radical a break with tradition to be undertaken as an official government policy.

There is also the simple question of time. A program of this nature would require years, perhaps generations, before fruition could be realized. During this time there would undoubtedly be rebellions and lapses into previous behavior patterns, straining both the internal political structure of the nations involved and their relations with each other. Unfortunately, time like the other resources needed is in short supply.

Another possible alternative would be to facilitate the nomadic patterns by recognizing that they are a reality, and opening the borders for free movement within prescribed limits but without changing the sovereignty of the geographic areas. This would entail the locating of Somali liaison

officers in key points of both Kenya and Ethiopia, and a degree of extraterritoriality for the nomads, or recognition of tribal law as paramount over local law. For both Kenya and Ethiopia, this comes too close to cession to be palatable since their sovereignty would be de jure under such an arrangement.

Without a resolution of the conflict between political boundaries and traditional tribal patterns, there is little hope that the current detente can be formalized into a lasting solution.

The acceptance of the greater Somalia concept. From the Somali point of view, the ideal solution would be the acceptance of the Greater Somalia concept on the part of France, Ethiopia, and Kenya with cession of the territory in question. The arguments in respect to this solution are implicit in the entire discussion of the question.

This is the expressed goal of the Somali Republic; it is explicitly stated in the Constitution, and has been implicit in both foreign and domestic policies since the foundation of the Republic. Realization of this concept would make the Somali Republic the largest ethnically homogeneous state in Africa, but in realizing its territorial claims, it would also acquire minorities such as the Afar in French Somaliland, the non-Muslim Galla, the Turkana, etc., who are ethnically cognates but are culturally distinct. It is likely that for this reason, frictions

along the new borders would not materially differ from the current problems.

The problem of administration also arises. Competent administrators are thinly spread in the current confines of the Republic, and indigenous administrators are rare in the irredenta. The strain of the additional areas could cause a total breakdown of the administrative structure or at the very least, strain it to the degree that its effectiveness would be reduced.

Except for Djibouti, the additional areas would not bring any additional wealth into the Republic. They have failed to pay their own way within the countries to which they now belong, and it is probable that they would be equally burdensome to the Republic.

As has been pointed out, the survival of Kenya and Ethiopia as political entities would be seriously jeopardized if they relinquished their Somali areas. Concessions to the Somali could result in the balkanization of the Ethiopian Empire, leaving an insignificant, land-locked Amheric kingdom in the highlands around Addis Ababa. Kenya would be no better off and once the fragmentation process started, it could easily lead to total disintegration, not only of Kenya but also Tanzania and Uganda as well.

The nationalists in the countries affected recognize that they must abide by the colonial boundaries they have inherited, and try to weld the diverse elements contained

within them into a single political entity or see them balkanize into nonviable tribal units.

Break-up of the Somali Republic. A unique solution was suggested to the author by two British-trained Somali Officials; one a civil servant and the other one a police officer. They suggested that if, after the death of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia became more democratic, the Somali Republic should be split along the 5° north parallel, and the area north of this line joined with the Ogaden and French Somaliland as a semi-autonomous state of Ethiopia. They visualized a federation in which the boundaries would be drawn along ethnic and religious lines, and the federal aspects of government would be conducted by a parliamentary structure based on proportional representation without the Coptic Christian domination of the present Ethiopian Government. They felt that the south portion, essentially the Benadir Coast, could either survive as a rump state, or similarly federate with Kenya.

Their justification for this solution was that the North had been largely neglected in the distribution of developmental projects and relegated to a secondary role in the Republic in almost every other respect. They expressed the feeling that in both economic and political spheres, the future of the area was more closely tied to developments in Ethiopia than to those in the southern part of the Republic.

As has been noted, it is unlikely that an Ethiopia of the type they conceive of as requisite for such a federation is apt to emerge in the near future. Equally remote is the likelihood that Somali nationalists would ever agree to the sacrifice of what they have already gained, or to any solution entailing a further division of the Somali people or the disappearance of the Somali Nation.

The most interesting aspect of this solution is the fact that it indicates the existence of at least a degree of dissatisfaction with the current structure of the Republic on the part of some of the elite.

East African federation. Carl Friedrich has described a federation in the following terms:

A federal system is a particular kind of constitutional order. The function it is supposed to serve is to restrain the powers wielded by the inclusive community, as well as those of the communities included within it. It is a kind of division or separation of powers, but applied on a spatial basis. This function of restraint may be and often is hidden by the motivation which leads to the establishment of a federal system. When the need for cooperation is uppermost in the minds of those who establish a federal system, they may think of the restraints purely in terms of concessions to the more reluctant participants.<sup>6</sup>

For Africa, federalization may be the alternative to balkanization along tribal lines. Most of the current political entities on the continent today are essentially federations of tribes, or elements of tribes joined together into a

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<sup>6</sup>Carl J. Friedrich, Man and His Government (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 597.

single nation-state for exactly the purposes outlined by Friedrich. Further federation of these entities into larger units could possibly provide even a better solution to the internal problems created by tribal cleavages and divisions, and at the same time create states of greater economic and political strength.

The dream of a single pan-African state advanced by Kwame Nkrumah and other visionaries is too idealistic to be realized in the near future. There are too many diverse and divisive elements predominating in the various nation-states. Significant regional unions, however, are practical and could provide a better base for an eventual pan-African federation. An East African Federation is one of the more plausible of these potential federations.

As previously noted, during the visits of Kenyatta and Ngala to Mogadiscio in 1962, the suggestion was advanced that the settlement of the Northern Frontier District problem might be reached in the context of an East African Federation to be formed after Kenya's independence. In this proposed federation, the unification of the Somali into a single political entity would be contingent on the success of the federation effort. Although rejected by the Somali at the time, this proposal now appears to offer very real possibilities.

What might be termed the core nations of an East African Federation have had some forty years of experience

in cooperative ventures under British tutelage. After the British assumed the mandate over Tanganyika at the end of World War I, efforts were made to weld the three British East African territories, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, into a single administrative unit. A common customs tariff was introduced on January 1, 1923 followed by the Conference of Governors of British East Africa instituted in 1927. The Conference had a permanent secretariat which directed such common services as the East African Meteorological Service, the East African Postal and Telegraph Administration, etc. The British had hoped to bring about a closer political federation as well, but this was thwarted by the mandate provisions and by objections from various interests in Kenya and Uganda.<sup>7</sup>

During World War II, the scope of the Governors' Conference expanded considerably with the establishing of inter-territorial boards to deal with manpower, wartime production, industrial management, refugees, price control, military and civilian cooperation, and demobilization. After the War, the British Government proposed a system to simplify and streamline joint activities through the formation of a permanent executive, the East Africa High Commission, assisted by inter-territorial advisory boards, advised by a Central Legislative Assembly, and having power to administer certain specified common services on an all-

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<sup>7</sup>Kenneth Ingham, op. cit., pp. 270-323.



East-African level.<sup>8</sup> The Commission was constituted on January 1, 1948 and administered some thirty services and departments. On December 9, 1961, with Tanganyika's independence, it was retitled the East African Common Services Organization.<sup>9</sup>

The East African Common Services Organization (EACSO) has continued to administer the same functions for the three countries since they have gained their independence in addition to Zanzibar after its federation with Tanganyika. Under its present structural arrangement, the overall policy and direction is in the hands of the Common Services Authority, consisting of the Prime Ministers of the three countries. Four ministerial committees direct the details of communications, finance, commercial and industrial co-ordination, and social and research services. In addition, there are three self-contained and self-sustaining services, Railways and Harbors, Posts and Telecommunications, and the East African Airways Corporation. The defense forces, the East African Rifles and the East African Navy, were disbanded and reconstituted as the separate defense establishments of each of the three countries.

The life of the East African Common Services Organi-

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<sup>8</sup>Colonial Office, Inter-Territorial Organization in East Africa, Revised Proposals, Colonial 120 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947).

<sup>9</sup>C. Leys and P. Robson, Federation in East Africa (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 31.

zation has not been completely smooth. There have been threats of withdrawal from one or all of its functions by the various members, and some of these threats have been realized for short periods of time. There have been complaints of one nation benefiting more from one of the services than its ratio of contribution and instances of rivalry in industrial development resulting in economic waste and political bitterness. These are the kinds of problems such a union might be expected to engender when its members are still seeking their own national identity. The important thing is that the Organization and its members have been able to surmount these obstacles and increase the scope of common interests.

In addition to the East African Common Services Organization, the three nations are also joined in the East African Common Market. In some respects this has been less successful because of the differences that have developed in respect to external trade patterns, particularly with the Communist nations, and internal conflicts and rivalries. Despite these problems, the East African Common Market has continued to grow, and is showing increasing evidence of being able to resolve its problems.

Carl Friedrich has stated,

The development of a multitude of common interests associated with markets and production facilities usually weaves an increasingly dense network of interpersonal relations, from mere verbal communication to connubium as the ultimate sign of established community.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Carl J. Friedrich, op. cit.

Among both the leaders and people of the three core nations, this desire for a formally established community is overwhelmingly strong. In polls conducted since 1960 by Marco Surveys Ltd., 73 to 96 percent of the population of the three countries have favored federation.<sup>11</sup> On June 5, 1963, Dr. Julius K. Nyerere, Dr. Milton Obote, and Jomo Kenyatta issued a federation declaration. Developments in Zanzibar, resulting in its federation with Tanganyika created problems which postponed the steps set forth in this joint declaration. All three of the principals have subsequently reaffirmed their desire to see the fruition of the concept.

How then could the Somali fit into this federation configuration which is still more concept than reality? The recent surfacing of more moderate leaders indicates that for the moment the frustration of recurring defeats, the sense of isolation, and the increasing Communist Bloc involvement in internal economic and political affairs have had a sobering effect on the nationalistic aspirations. The fact that this change in leadership was accomplished within the legitimate format of constitutional processes is indicative that the change represents the willingness, if not the absolute desire, of the electorate to undertake a new approach.

If the rapport developed during the present detente

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<sup>11</sup>Marco Surveys Ltd., East African Survey (Nairobi: Market Research Company of East Africa, annual).

can be formalized into the first steps towards federation, the balance toward moderation represented by the present coalition may crystallize with sufficient permanency to ward off renewed efforts by the militant nationalists. Federation is not a static state, but a dynamic process, and the success of Somali integration into an East African Federation will largely depend on the manner in which the process is undertaken. It must be done with visible progress, and yet, without traumatic suddenness. The federation with the fullest and strongest joint political system may be the one entered into very gingerly. The experience of Mali and Nigeria tends to indicate that an initially strong federation, one with a wide list of federal constitutional powers, has less chance of ultimate success than gradual evolution towards federation starting with joint arrangements, some federal and some administrative.

For Somalia, initiation into the federation process in concrete terms could be undertaken by gradual integration into the East Africa Common Services Organization and the East Africa Common Market, and candid recognition on the part of her neighbors of the role of the Somali Prime Minister as informal protagonist and spokesman for all Somali, a role which Mohammed Ibrahim has adopted.

Heretofore, Somalia's chronic poverty would have relegated it to the role of poor relative in any such affiliation. The recent mineral discoveries, previously

discussed, will now permit it to enter as a full-fledged paying member and should make it possible for many Somali imports from Europe to be shifted to African sources.

From the point of view of the total Somali problem, Ethiopia too would have to be incorporated into the federal structure. The current conditions in Ethiopia make this extremely difficult. It is doubtful if the Emperor could, or would, relinquish any degree of his sovereignty to a federal structure, and it is certain, for reasons previously discussed, that he would not release the Ogaden to an all-Somali state within the federation. In respect to Ethiopia then, cooperation with or limited membership in the federation would be all that could be expected in the near future. This would not solve the Somali problem in respect to the Ogaden but might ease the tension.

Mauritius, Sudan, Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, and Malawi have also expressed interest in being included in the East African Federation. These Nations all have cogent reasons for desiring such an affiliation, but an association of this size and diversity would present infinitely more factors to be considered and problems to be resolved before full federation could be realized.

#### SUMMARY

None of the four possible solutions presented here offer positive assurance of providing an unequivocal answer to the problem. As has been pointed out, there are advantages

and disadvantages to each, and each might also entail consequences of an unforeseen nature which could alter the expected course of events.

It is obvious that any permanent solution must be found within the context of African community interests and will require a degree of compromise with existing separatist, nationalist aspirations on the part of all. For such a compromise to be possible, the chosen alternative must afford positive advantages and opportunities to all participants equal to, or greater than, any other course of action. Gradual federation is not a panacea, and its realities will no doubt fall far short of its theoretical potential, but it does appear to offer the most plausible approach to such a solution

## CHAPTER VI

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

#### SUMMARY

To the Somali, realization of the Greater Somalia concept appears as a birthright, a fulfillment of destiny, and a righting of wrongs imposed upon them during the colonization of Africa. The general feeling is that until the irredenta are united with the Republic, and the polity and ethnic structure coincide, the achievement of true nationhood is only partially complete. During the course of the colonial experience, the traditional ethnic homogeneity of the Somali was translated into a strong desire for political unity. The lessons of history were not lost on them, and they recognized that their division among the colonial powers was facilitated by their lack of central political control, and by the internal inter-clan conflicts and rivalries prevalent during the pre-Colonial period.

As has been previously mentioned, this goal of unity has been incorporated into the Constitution of the Republic, and is, therefore, not only a part of the patriotic folklore of the people, but an expressed national goal. In a speech to the National Assembly in August 1961, Abdirashid succinctly summed up Somali foreign policy:

Somalia, though recognising its traditional friends, intends to establish relations with the greatest number of independent countries keeping outside any political

bloc, setting as goals of its international activity the maintenance of peace, the respect of the principle of nationality, collaboration and solidarity among states, particularly among the African and Moslem ones, putting at the summit of its thoughts and actions its intention to bring about by peaceful and legal means the unification of the Somali territories.<sup>1</sup>

As often as not in the eight years of Somali independence, achievement of the primary goal of unification has been in direct conflict with, and antithetical to, the fulfillment of the other expressed aims of national foreign policy. Where this conflict of aims has arisen, it has always been resolved in favor of pursuing Somali unity. This has resulted in an isolation from traditional friends, from neighboring states, and from the mainstream of African political development. With this sense of isolation, there has developed an acute sense of vulnerability, and a deep need for outside support. In turn, this need has facilitated Soviet penetration and Egyptian pan-Islam empire building. Without conflicting interests in the area such as those of the United States and Great Britain, both the Soviets and Egypt have been in a position to take a pro-Somali stand, not out of altruistic motives based on a feeling of the righteousness of the Somali cause, but in furtherance of their own strategic aims. This has brought what is essentially a local problem into the realm of world politics and the East-West struggle.

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<sup>1</sup>Presidency of the Council of Ministers, op. cit., p. XXI.



In this study, the emphasis has been on the Kenya-Somali aspect of this multi-faceted problem. The ultimate solution, however, must be a total solution, nothing less will bring stability and safety to this corner of Africa.

The Kenya aspect does have certain advantages for a case study. It involves less emotionalism and has a shorter history than the Somali-Ethiopian controversy; it has been written about less, and, therefore, offers more fresh ground to explore; it is more dynamic and more amenable to solution, and may provide the keystone to a complete solution; and, it has essentially been the focal point of Somali attention since independence.

In respect to the Somali claims to the adjacent area of Kenya, justice would seem to lie on the side of the Somali. In governing the area as part of the British East Africa Protectorate, and later of Kenya, the British held the area apart, as an appendage rather than as a portion of the integral whole. For a people with the ethnic unity of the Somali, this served to strengthen their bonds outside of the territory, and precluded the development of any sense of communality with the other peoples with whom they were geographically bound. By holding the Somali outside of the evolving political processes of the colony, the British further emphasized this sense of separatism.

If, at the time they granted independence to the Somaliland Protectorate, and permitted them to join the new

Republic, the British had granted the same privilege to the Kenya Somali, the viability of the future Kenya Nation would not have been affected. The repercussions on Anglo-Ethiopian relations probably would not have been any more severe than those resulting from the granting of independence to the Protectorate alone.

When Macmillan made his policy statement to Parliament in respect to the Greater Somalia concept at the time independence was granted to the Protectorate, he established a clear and concise position to which Great Britain could have adhered without equivocation. Although not palatable to the Somali, it was no less so than the positions of Ethiopia and France. The seeming deviation from this position at the time of the Lancaster House Conference in 1962 inordinately raised Somali hopes that the Macmillan statement had been abrogated. On this premise, the Abdirashid Government in collaboration with and in support of the Northern Frontier District Somali, took a position which eventually compromised it in the eyes of the Somali people. Not only was the Abdirashid Government compromised, but the whole concept of peaceful reunification was discredited, and the subsequent violence became almost an inevitability.

The actual British position during this period, and the seeming contradictions in it will not be explained until the archives for this period are opened, if ever. In the meantime, the observer can only speculate, and this is

relatively unproductive. It is hard to conceive that the British, with their intimate knowledge of the Somali, and with the statements made by the Northern Frontier District representation at the Lancaster House Conference, could have underestimated the seriousness of the situation. It is equally inconceivable that they would deliberately saddle Kenya with this problem in addition to all of the others involved in independence, particularly in view of the fact that Kenya was to remain a member of the Commonwealth. It is possible that the answer is simply that which appears on the surface, that the British did intend in all good faith to abide by what at least appears to have been the understanding during the Lancaster House Conference, and then had to change course to satisfy Kenya in order to keep it in the Commonwealth and protect British investments. This would have been a calculated risk on the part of the British.

For the Somali, both those in the Northern Frontier District and the Republic, there were essentially three choices. If a calculated program of violence such as that launched against independent Kenya had been undertaken earlier against the British, enough pressure might have been generated in both Great Britain and in Kenya to force the issue prior to Kenya's independence. Alternatively, if the Somali had fully participated in the Kenyan legislative process from the time they were first admitted to membership instead of boycotting elections and practicing obstructionist tactics, it is possible they might have been able to make their

feelings known and understood and might have gained support for their aspirations. The third choice, the one taken, obviously failed.

There is little question that the course followed by the Northern Frontier District Somali was largely determined by, or at least coordinated with, the Government in Mogadiscio. Since the Abdirashid Government had adopted a course of pursuing the Greater Somalia goal by peaceful, diplomatic means within the spirit of the Constitution, they could neither counsel nor countenance a program of violence when it might have been most effective. By the same token, counseling cooperation with the Kenya Government would have been inexplicable to the ultra-nationalists, and would have assured the downfall of the Government.

The seeming British perfidy led inevitably to the discrediting of the Government of Abdirashid, and to the program of violence and cooperation with the Soviet-Egyptian bloc which followed. It is to the Somali credit that the change in government accompanying this change in policy was achieved by constitutional means.

It is ironic that the restoration of moderates to power was almost a direct result of a miscalculation by the Soviet-Egyptian bloc in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Again, by constitutional means, Somali policy was redirected towards a more moderate, conciliatory course. It is probable that if this had not occurred, the tempo of violence would have

increased to the point of open warfare between Kenya and Somalia since the frustration and the cost of the desultory guerrilla war were telling on both Nations.

The Government of Mohammed Ibrahim has made rapid strides in reaching a rapprochement with Kenya, in breaking down the isolation, and in returning Somalia to a more moderate course in its relations with other nations. The ability of this government to survive, as with all Somali governments, will directly depend on progress in solving the irredenta problem.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The Somali irredenta problem is one of the unfortunate legacies of the Imperial partition of Africa and its continued existence can be attributed to the same power structure which gave it birth. The major powers have, for various reasons, failed to resolve it when there were opportunities to do so, and a solution must now be found within an African context.

Until a solution equitable and acceptable to all concerned is found, the stability and economic progress of a vital part of Africa will be profoundly disturbed. There appears to be little likelihood that the democratic machinery of the Somali Government can be overturned by any developments in this problem, but the nature of the government brought to power will always be in direct response to develop-

ments in this area rather than to domestic problems. This has been made clearly evident by the changes in government to date. Although the feeling of isolation has been somewhat ameliorated by recent developments, there is still a strong residue of distrust towards the West and toward an Organization of African Unity with its seat in Addis Ababa. The strong feeling of need for external support and understanding still exists, and if events seemingly verify this sense of distrust, ultra-nationalists could again come to power, and the position of the Egyptian-Soviet bloc could again predominate. With the recent mineral discoveries, the desirability of Somalia as a client-state is even greater for Egypt since this would provide a ready source of material to fulfil its nuclear ambitions.

The way to a solution seems to lie in a supra-national East African Federation. The basic foundation for a political structure of this nature already exists in the Common Services Organization and the Common Market currently shared by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The inclusion of Somalia in these organizations as an initial step toward ultimate political union could provide a context in which the irredenta problem could be solved outside of the separate nationalisms of Somalia and Kenya, and one which could include Ethiopia as well.

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